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Summary  findings
There have been many attempts to infer latent  heterogeneity remains a fundamental but unresolved
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for observed variables. Success in doing so could greatly  a further problem. Current methods do not yield a
improve government performance.  consistent estimate of even the mean latent performance
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performance is measured relative to a frontier. Section 6 concludes.
2.  Assessing performance  with incomplete data
A common practice in development policy discussions is to compare an aggregate
welfare metric for a country with the metric's mean conditional on national income per
capita. In an early and influential example, Sen (1981) looked at the deviations of actual
social indicators from their expected values given average income. These residuals
suggested that Sri Lanka was the best performer. Using a regression of (log) life
expectancy on (log) income per capita, Sen showed that the expected national income
corresponding to Sri Lanka's (high) life expectancy given income was about 20 times
higher than the country's actual income. This excellent conditional performance was
interpreted as support for Sri Lanka's high level of social spending over many decades.
Conditional comparisons of this sort have since become common in both
academic literature and policy discussions. They have taken the form of either the
"horizontal" comparison made by Sen (in which the difference in performance is
measured in the units of the horizontal axis) or the straight "vertical" residuals. One can
find many examples in studies of country performance in education and health care (see,
for example, World Bank, 1993; Kakwani, 1993; Wang et al., 1999). The UNDP's
"Human Development Reports" have often contained statements about country
performance conditional on average income (see, for example, UNDP, 1996).
In a recent example, the WHO's "World Health Report" for 1999 provides health
"performance measures" over time by country, based on the residuals obtained by
regressing health aggregates on the log of GDP per capita, its squared value and a trend
3(WHO, 1999, Annex Table 6). The residuals are taken to measure public performance,
notably through the expansion and dissemination of knowledge about health care. It is
claimed that some countries have performed considerably better than others, as assessed
by this method.
The same basic idea can be used to assess the cost-effectiveness of public
spending on social services in reducing poverty and inequality, recognizing that there are
unobserved inefficiencies in social spending. In a recent example, Gouyette and Pestieau
(1999) compare measures of poverty and inequality with levels of social spending across
OECD countries, and they use this comparison to form judgements about the efficiency
of the welfare state.
The application found in Gouyette and Pestieau provides a potential model for
further work of this sort, extended to include developing countries. This offers hope for
measuring latent country effort in fighting poverty, thereby enhancing (dramatically, it
would seem) the scope for using external development assistance to encourage country
action to reduce poverty. Ostensibly, this method turns a potentially difficult agency
problem (with hidden information on government effort) into a relatively simple contract.
For this reason, and also to help make the discussion more concrete, I will draw on the
Gouyette and Pestieau application repeatedly in this paper. However, this is not a
comment on Gouyette and Pestieau; the generic method is more common than this one
paper (and that paper contains much of interest that I do not touch on here).
Indeed, the method has not been confined to country comparisons. The same basic
idea has been used to assess the performance of business schools (Hamlen and
Southwick, 1989; Tracy and Waldfogel, 1997). Here the performance indicator is the
4average starting silary ofigraduates, and the controls are measures of student quality (ltest
scores and experience). The residuals are taken to measure the school's "value addedL".
Naturally there have been some disputes in the literature about how the precise
way  such conditional comparisons should be made. In the development literature, thLere
have been concerns about the functional form of the measures used (as in Kakwani's,
1993, analysis of how to measure achievements in health development). And there has
been an issue about whether one should use levels or growth rates (as in Bhalla and
Glewwe, 1986; Aturupane et al., 1994; Ranis et al., 2000). But all these methods share
the common feature of using conditional comparisons to assess latent aspects of
performance.
Some of the specific conditional comparisons have been controversial. For
example, Sen's (1981) claim that Sri Lanka was an outstanding performer in social
policies given its income generated considerable  debate (see Bhalla and Glewwe, 1986,
and Sen's, 1988, reply).' However, subsequent analysis of time series data for Sri Lanka
has demonstrated a significant and quantitatively important role of social spending in
reducing infant mortality at given average income (Anand and Ravallion, 1993).
And there are often concerns about the narrowness of the welfare objective
assumed by the method in practice. For example, reducing poverty is not the only
objective of social spending (as Gouyette and Pestieau, 1999, note). Judging the
efficiency of the welfare state by only one of its objectives is hazardous. And even if
poverty was the sole objective, there are a number of issues begging about how this
For a review  of this debate  see Kakwani  (1993).  Also see  Anand  and Ravallion  (  1993)
and Aturupane  et al. (1994).
5should be measured in this context.,However, I shall put these data problems to one side,
and focus on the reliability of the conditional comparison method for an agreed objective.
The right way to interpret these conditional measures of country performance has
never been entirely clear in this literature. A country that appears to be performing
poorly now in terms of its average health attainments conditional on income could
become a star performer in the future simply by (suffering) negative growth, without any
gain in actual health attainments (Ravallion, 1997). This is a nagging concern about the
country comparisons of health care performance found in WHO (1999).
However, the literature has tended to justify these methods on intuitive grounds.
We still do not have a clear idea of the conditions under which they will be reliable.
3.  A case study on measuring the efficiency of social spending
There is a large literature on how the welfare impacts of public spending on social
services can be assessed empirically with micro data. 2 A prominent issue has been the
possible biases involved (notably in the common forms of non-experimental evaluation).
The methods considered here take a far more aggregated approach than is common in the
evaluation literature. But (as I will discuss later) there are similar concerns about biases
in using cross-country comparisons to make statements about country performance,
though the source of bias depends on specifics of each method.
In their use of the conditional comparison method in assessing the efficiency of
social spending, Gouyette and Pestieau (1999) find wide differences in poverty rates
conditional on social spending in a sample of OECD countries. Their measure of poverty
is the percentage of the population with adjusted household income less than half the
6median (following a common practice in Western Europe). They point to the example of
France, which has about the same social spending as Belgium (26% of GDP), yet a
poverty rate that is three times higher. If France had eliminated the waste in its social
spending then (ceteris paribus) it could achieve a poverty rate of 3% with its current
spending - instead of 9%. Two thirds of France's poverty is attributed to its inefficiernt
social spending. If this is right, the policy implications are of great interest.
A problem with conditional comparison methods in practice has been to come up
with a cardinal measure of the value of the latent performance attribute. Looking at the
residuals in the regression of observed performance on its observed determinants,
practitioners of this method make claims about how one country is doing relative to
another. But one would also like to have a measure of absolute performance.
The types of "horizontal" comparisons made by Sen (1981) provide a simple
monetary measure of performance. Gouyette and Pestieau (1999) build on this method by
using their regressions to locate an "efficiency frontier" for the welfare state. They locate
the frontier by regressing their poverty (or inequality) measure on social spending and
then shifting the regression line down to find the country with lowest poverty conditional
on social spending i.e., the largest (negative)  residual. They then interpret the difference
between actual spending and its expected value on this frontier as the amount of
"inefficiency" in social spending. I will call this the "Efficiency Frontier Method" (EFM).
Figure 1 illustrates the method. The ellipse encompasses the scatter points of the
data, and the upper straight line is the regression line; the lower one is the estimated
frontier, passing through the data point for country B, with the largest residual. Mean
2  A useful compilation  of papers  following  various  approaches,  with critical  commentary
by the editors,  can be found in van de Walle  and Nead (1995).
7social spending is S,  while the estimated mean level of efficient social spending is
SE corresponding to the average level of poverty (P) on the frontier. The estimated
mean level of inefficient spending is the difference between S and SE.
Across their OECD sample, Gouyette and Pestieau find a (highly) significant
negative correlation between social spending and poverty, as measured by the proportion
of people with household adjusted income below half the median. They also find a
significant negative correlation with the Gini index of income inequality. On
constructing their efficiency frontiers from these regressions, they present graphs of
poverty and inequality in OECD countries against social spending. Belgium turns out to
be the best performer in their main analysis. The results indicate some large
inefficiencies, such that much greater welfare impacts could be achieved at the same
budgetary cost, or that the cost of the same impact could be greatly reduced.
Gouyette and Pestieau do not give the implied levels of inefficient social spending
by country. But it is not difficult to make the calciuations. Table 1 gives the share of
social spending that is deemed "inefficient". 3 The average level of inefficient social
spending is one third of total social spending, or about 9% of GDP. There is considerable
variation. For Holland, about half of social spending is deemed inefficient, while for
Belgium it is zero (by construction) and for Sweden it is under 20%.
All this is a natural extension of long-standing methods found in the literature
whereby cross-country comparisons conditional on the mean of one or more relevant
control variables (average incomes or public spending, for example) are used to make
3  The calculations  correspond  to Figure  2 in Gouyette  and Pestieau.  I did not get  the same
coefficients  they report,  but the difference  is small. My  estimate  of the regression  coefficient  of
log poverty  on log social  spending  was -1.71 (t-4.23) with an intercept  of 7.49  (t=5.71).
8statements about country performance. Belgium plays a similar role in the analysis of
Gouyette and Pestieau (1999) as Sri Lanka played in Sen (1981). The following sections
examine the properties of these methods, and their reliability for guiding policy.
4.  Using conditional comparisons to assess country performance
The types of cross-country performance comparisons discussed in the last two
sections can be applied to many types of policies, and they can yield seemingly strong
results about otherwise unobserved aspects of country performance. The fact that these
are such simple and seemingly powerful methods, that influence policy discussions,
makes it compelling to take a closer look at their foundations.
Continuing with the example of the problem addressed by Gouyette and Pestieau,
"inefficient social spending" in this context can be defined as social spending that has no
(direct or indirect) impact on poverty or inequality. Observed social spending combines
two components - one that reduces poverty and one that does not.  The underlying true
regression gives poverty (or inequality) as a decreasing function of the first componernt,
but (by definition) the second has no effect.  However, the estimated regression cannot
make this distinction, and so it is total social spending that appears on the right hand side.
Let the two components of total social spending (S) be SE,  the efficient
component, and S',  the inefficient component; the level of poverty depends on  SE,  but
not S'.  Let a +,8  SE give the expected level of poverty in country i given efficient
social spending 5,  i.e., the actual level of poverty is:
Pi =a+f8SE  +6  (1)
9where 'a and /3 are parameters andsi  is a zero-mean i.i.d. error term.  We do not
observe the amount of efficient social spending but only total social spending:
i=  Si +s  (2)
Consider France again. The actual level of poverty in France is:
PF  =a  +/  JSF  +-OF  (3)
Belgium, on the other hand has the same levei of social spending but a much lower
poverty rate. The relevant counter-factual level of poverty in France is found by replacing
its wasteful social spending with the efficient social spending found in Belgium, while
holding all else constant. So efficient social spending in France rises from SF  to
SF  = SB.  This new level of poverty in France is given by:
p;  =a+/,SB  +6F  (4)
The amount by which poverty in France would fall is then:
PF  PF-(PF  PB)  (-£F - B)  -(5)
(Noting that PB = a  +13  SB + CB  since Belgium is deemed to be on the efficiency
frontier.)  So to calculate the extra poverty in France due to inefficient social spending we
have to net out the difference in poverty rates conditional on efficient social spending.
To be correct, the inference drawn from this conditional country comparison
requires that there are no differences in poverty between countries once one controls for
differences in levels of efficient social spending not total social spending. However, one
can think of many reasons for differences in poverty and inequality between countries
besides differences in efficient social spending. Differences in the progressivity of the
taxes used to finance social spending, and in labor market policies are examples.
10Notice that (so far) the regression model takes a back seat role. We did not of
course need the regression to compare France and Belgium, since they happen to have a
very similar level of social spending. Other applications of this type of conditional
comparison use the regression to establish the conditional mean, at any country's actual
level of spending. This is then used as the benchmark for judging performance. Bias in
the regression parameters is not of concern; all we want is a good estimate of the
conditional mean. One need not even use a parametric model for this purpose.
However, the key point remains that controlling for the observed level of
spending does not allow one to identify the latent difference in the efficiency of spending.
Other latent variables and measurement errors create heterogeneity; poverty rates
naturally vary at given levels of efficient social spending. We can call this the
"heterogeneity bias" in conditional comparisons of country performance.
Heterogeneity bias will become less severe the more controls for observable
heterogeneity that one adds. Instead of comparing poverty in France with Belgium (with
the only control being for their observed social spending) suppose we compare it with the
expected poverty level in Belgium if it had the other observed characteristics of France.
As long as those characteristics have some explanatory power when added to the
regression of poverty on social spending, then this modified conditional comparison will
be more revealing of the latent difference in the efficiency of social spending.
For example, the poverty rate in OECD countries may well also depend on the
scale of active labor market programs. Such programs in Belgium accounted for 1.210/6  of
GDP in 1985-91, versus 0.77% in France (Vanhoudt, 1997, quoting OECD data). On
adding the share of GDP devoted to active labor market programs to the regression of
11poverty on social spending I find that both variables have poverty reducing effects and
are significant. The regression coefficient on social spending is -0.37 and that on active
labor market programs is -2.90 (with t-ratios based on White standard errors of 2.85 and
2.12 respectively). (Using a double log specification the coefficients on log social
spending and active labor market programs are -1.04 and -0.50, with t-ratios of 2.50 and
2.11.) Since Belgium devoted a larger share of GDP to these programs than did France,
this accounts in part for the difference in poverty; about 1.3 percentage points of the
difference can be explained this way. No doubt other observable sources of
heterogeneity could be found to help bridge the gap.
This type of latent heterogeneity is familiar from the literature on program
evaluation. Controlling for observed performance attributes does not assure unbiased
estimates of program impact, though there is evidence that with careful choice of controls
(such as using propensity score matching methods) the bias can be greatly reduced
(Heckman et al., 1998). The low dimensionality of the controls used in past conditional
country comparisons does not, however, leave one with much confidence.
5.  Large sample properties
Sizable errors in estimating a latent performance attribute in a specific country
cannot be ruled out. How do these methods perform in the aggregate for large samples?
When the benchmark is the conditional mean, and this is estimated consistently,
then the heterogeneity bias in a comparison of any one country's performance with that
of the benchmark country will persist no matter how large the sample. The average
deviation from this benchmark will obviously converge in probability to zero as the
sample size increases. That merely tells us how uninteresting that benchmark is in
12measuring aggregate performance, which helps motivate interest locating an efficiency
frontier.  So this section will focus on the large sample properties of the EFM, continuing
to use as an example the specific application found in Gouyette and Pestieau (1999).
Consider again the regression specification of poverty on social spending in
equation (1); this can be written as:
Pi= a +/  3Si  +  p,  (i1  ,...,n)  (6.1)
Af  =-iS/I  +6i  (6.2)
This has a superficial resemblance to the stochastic frontier production model in whicht
the error term in an empirical production of cost function combines a one-sided
disturbance term (representing inefficiency) as well as a regular zero mean error (Aigner
et al., 1977). However, there is an important difference, namely that in the present case
the one-sided component is correlated with the regressors. Existing methods for
estimating stochastic frontier models on cross-sectional data do not apply to this case.
In virtually all of the conditional comparison methods found in the literature,
equation (6.1) is estimated using ordinary least squares. (I discuss the problems in doing
so later.)  The EFM then estimates the level of efficient social spending in country i by
the value of its spending if it were on the "efficiency frontier" obtained by shifting the
intercept of their regression until it passes through the data point for the country with the
largest (negative) residual (AB).  In other words, the estimate of efficient social spending
for country i (SE)  is obtained by inverting the following equation:
Pi =f+Et+,B  (7)
13where,&  and Ai are  their least squares  estimates  of the  parameters  of (6.1).  It can be seen
from (7) that the estimate of efficient social spending in any country is nothing more than
a fixed linear transform of its observed poverty measure. By definition:
Pi =a+3S,  +  (8)
Subtracting (7) from (8), the estimated level of inefficient spending is:
Si  = Si  _  i  = PB  i  S-SB  + (PB  PI  (9)
where the lower case letters denote deviations from sample means. As n goes to infinity,
the sample mean of Sf  will converge in probability to:
plim(Sg  In)=  =  -S  +  PB  (10)
pBi(t  S  plim(,8)
How does this compare to the true mean of inefficient social spending? Taking
expectations through (6.2), E(S)  = -16E(S'); this is the expected value of the decrease
in poverty if inefficient social spending was replaced by efficient social spending. So:
E(Sl)  =E(IP)  =-sB+  PB  IPB  (11)
Comparing (10) and (11), the asymptotic bias in the estimate of average level of
inefficient social spending is then given by:
Bias  PB  1  +  (12)
There are two sources of bias. The first relates to the bias in the regression coefficient,
leading to miss-identification of the shape of the efficiency frontier. The second relates to
14unobserved variables that influence poverty in the benchmark country at given social
spending i.e., miss-identification of the height of the frontier.
Consider the first source of bias. If one accepts that there is inefficiency in social
spending (E(S')  > 0) on a priori grounds, then the OLS estimate of /3  is automatically
inconsistent. If wasteful social spending is uncorrelated with efficient social spending
then this is nothing more than a classic attenuation bias due to measurement error in a
regressor. The OLS regression coefficient of P on S converges in probability to
/l3var(SE)Ivar(S).  Then (12) simplifies to:
Bias  PB Var(S)  J 1B  (13)
/3var(SE)  /3
The first term on the RHS must be positive if social spending reduces poverty (,B < 0)
and the benchmark country has lower poverty than average (PB <  ).
With respect to the second source of bias, notice that assuming that social
spending in the benchmark country is entirely efficient (SB = 0) still leaves the bias due
to other unobserved variables influencing poverty in the benchmark country (CB  ￿  0).
There is no obvious a priori argument one could make about this source of bias, and so
the overall direction of bias is theoretically ambiguous. If the benchmark country has
favorable conditions for poverty reduction, at given social spending (sB < 0) then this
second source of bias will reinforce the bias arising from the regression miss-
specification when the benchmark country has below average poverty. For example, aLs
we saw in Section 3, Belgium's active labor market policies tend to be poverty reducing
at given social spending; this effect would add to the bias in the estimate of aggregate
15inefficiency by leading the method to miss-locate the efficiency frontier. However, if the
benchmark country has sufficiently unfavorable conditions then the method will
underestimate the extent of inefficiency in social spending.
Figure 2 illustrates the case when the benchmark country has favorable conditions
for reducing poverty. The bold line is the true efficiency frontier, with a steeper slope (the
first source of bias) and at a higher level (the second source) than the estimated frontier.
The way the figure is drawn, the EFM's estimate of mean inefficient social spending is
roughly double the true mean (i.e., the distance from X to Z is roughly double that from
Y to Z).
To make the discussion concrete, the above analysis has focused on the
application in Gouyette and Pestieau (1999). This is only one of many possibilities.  In
keeping with the literature on human development (discussed in section 2), one could
reinterpret the above analysis, reading "P" as a social indicator such as infant mortality,
and "S" as GDP per capita, some of which is devoted to things that are good for child
health (SE)  while some is not (S').  For example, it has been argued that aggregate
health indicators such as the infant mortality rate depend far more on incomes of the poor
than the nonpoor (Bidani and Ravallion, 1997), so country performance in income
poverty reduction matters to human development. (Indeed, along with the provision of
key social services, this may well account fully for the relationship with average income;
see Anand and Ravallion, 1993). Some country (possibly Sri Lanka) will anchor the
frontier, and one could then measure the distance from this frontier to the regression line,
or any country's data point, as a measure of performance relative to this welfare
16objective. How reliable a guide to country performance all this will be will then dependl
on the factors I have identified above.
6.  Conclusions
Empirical economists normally ignore the residuals, and focus on the regression
line (though often using the residuals in testing the regression). A strand of empirical
work has tried to learn something more from the residuals. The starting point is the
observation that cross-country differences in aggregate welfare measures conditional on
observed welfare determinants will contain the effects of latent determinants of interest,
notably the unobserved efforts of governments. But they will contain a lot more than that,
including measurement errors.
Merely controlling for the observed determinants does not, in general, allow onLe
to infer the effect of just one of the unobservables, or any subset. This is an obvious but
fundamental identification problem in all such methods of using cross-country
comparisons to assess specific latent aspects of government performance. Nor can one
rely on large samples to get rid of the problem.
Measuring performance relative to an "efficiency frontier" adds a further source
of bias, via the model used to locate the frontier. Total social spending (for example)
must surely be correlated with it's own components, including both the efficient and
inefficient types of spending. So the error term in a regression of poverty on social
spending is very likely to be correlated with the regressor, rendering least squares
estimates (including the residuals) biased and inconsistent. This leads to miss-
identification of the shape of the frontier, which pushes the method toward
overestimation of the inefficiency of social spending. Similarly, if one is using this
17method to /assess  country performance in child health policies by looking at the residuals
from a regression of the infant mortality rate on average income, there is likely to be a
bias due to correlation between the latent policy variables and income.  Unlike the
standard conditional comparisons, bias in the regression parameters now introduces a bias
in the inferences drawn about country performance, because the analyst gets the slope of
the efficiency frontier systematically wrong.
Latent heterogeneity is also a problem in locating the efficiency frontier. There
will be latent determinants of income distribution in the best-case "frontier" countries that
have nothing to do with social spending policies. Favorable (unfavorable) latent
conditions in the frontier countries will lead the frontier method to overestimate
(underestimate) the potential for improving policies.
The direction of bias in estimates of latent policy variables cannot be determined
on theoretical grounds. Indeed, it is not clear what can be inferred about the aggregate
cost-effectiveness of public policies even in large samples. And it is dangerous indeed to
try to use this type of method to say something about the performance of a specific
country in a sample of any size.
Adding extra control variables will help, though even with lots of controls, one
must take seriously the problem that the unobserved and observed attributes of
performance are unlikely to be orthogonal. Any independent evidence on the reliability of
observed performance indicators would also help by providing information about the
likely biases in least squares estimates. But it is not immediately obvious where this
evidence would come from in practice. Alternatively, one might look for valid
instrumental variables, though it is not clear what would qualify in this context. Panel
18data  would  not help much  in the settings  in which  this problem  arises,  since  assuming
that the latent  performance  attribute  is time invariant  (and  identified)  would  greatly
diminishing  the method's  attraction  as a tool for monitoring  performance  over  time.
So  this review  must end on a rather  negative  note.  There  appears  to be little hope
of using  the existing  methods  found  in the literature  to calibrate  a reliable  measure  of
latent  country  or institutional  performance.
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21Table 1: Total social spending and estimated inefficient social spending
Poverty rate  Social spending  Inefficient social
(% below half median  (% of GDP)  spending, estimated by
adjusted income)  1991-93  mean  the Efficiency Frontier
Method (% of GDP)
Belgium  3.3  25.7  0.0
Denmark  6.3  31.1  13.5
France  8.7  26.2  11.6
Germany  6.2  26.7  8.9
Ireland  8.1  21.4  6.2
Italy  9.8  23.3  9.7
Netherlands  7.2  30.9  14.6
Spain  9.1  19.7  5.5
United Kingdom  10.8  24.3  11.4
Austria  8.6  24.0  9.3
Finland  4.6  30.6  9.4
Sweden  2.5  37.0  6.8
United States  17.2  14.8  5.0
Mean  7.9  25.8  8.6
Note:  Data  on poverty  and social  spending  are  from Gouyette  and Pestieau  (1999)  who cite the
Luxembourg  Income  Study  and the OECD  as the sources.
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